


# NEGOTIATIONS OF ARAB STATES UNDER UNFCCC

Interlinkages and Recommendations



**FRIEDRICH  
EBERT  
STIFTUNG**



Climate and Energy Project  
مشروع الطاقة والمناخ



**Authors:**  
Mustafa Hashem  
Lina Yassin  
Ahmad Saba Al Leil

**Reviewer:** Saber Osman

May, 2022



Climate and Energy Project  
مشروع الطاقة والمناخ

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## About Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Regional Climate and Energy Project MENA

The Regional Climate and Energy Project MENA advocates for an energy transition into renewable energy and energy efficiency. It continues to search for just transition solutions in the energy sector that ensure both, the protection of the planet and the people.

As the MENA region is one of the areas most heavily affected by climate change, we contribute to policy advising, research, and advocacy in the areas of climate change policy, energy transition, and urban sustainability, with the support of research institutions, civil society organizations, and other partners in the region and Europe.

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### **Authors:**

Mustafa Hashem  
Lina Yassin  
Ahmad Saba Al Leil

### **Reviewer:**

Saber Osman

**May, 2022**

### **Responsible:**

Sarah Hepp - Head of the Regional Climate and Energy Project MENA

### **Contact:**

amman@fes.de  
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung  
Amman Office  
P.O. Box 941876 Amman  
11194 - Jordan

Negotiations of Arab States  
Under UNFCCC; Interlinkages and  
Recommendations

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's Regional Climate and Energy Project in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has commissioned, edited, reviewed, and published this study in cooperation with Climate Tracker

# **NEGOTIATIONS OF ARAB STATES UNDER UNFCCC**

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Interlinkages and Recommendations



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
## Chapter 1

# The basics of UNFCCC

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## 1.1 The history of climate negotiations

Climate change was identified as a global problem by the world over 40 years ago. This timeline highlights some of the key events in the history of climate diplomacy:



## 1.2 What is the UNFCCC?

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty, founded in 1992. Its objective (UNFCCC Art. 2) is to “stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.

The Convention divides countries in Annex 1 for the developed countries which consist of 52 countries members of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), meanwhile the countries not included in Annex I, they are the developing countries and they called (Non-Annex countries). The Secretariat to the Convention is based in Bonn.

The UNFCCC has Governing Bodies, which are the supreme decision-makers for the different treaties. COP is the decision-making body for the UNFCCC Convention, CMP for the Kyoto Protocol, and CMA for the Paris Agreement.

## The Subsidiary Bodies assist the governing bodies in different issues:

- **SBSTA:** Carries out methodological work under the COP, the CMP, and the CMA, and promotes collaboration in the field of research and systematic observation of the climate system.
- **SBI:** Supports all implementation issues under the COP, CMP, and more CMA using instruments such as transparency, mitigation, adaptation, finance. It aims at enhancing the ambition of Parties on all aspects of its agenda.

**COP:** Conference of the Parties

**CMP:** Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

**CMA:** Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

**SBSTA:** Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

**SBI:** Subsidiary Body for Implementation


The COP, CMP, and CMA are all hosted annually. COP is the common name used in the promotions but, the actual name of the meetings includes all three (i.e. COP26/CMP16/CMA3). The SBI and SBSTA meet twice a year.

## There are different types of actors who can attend those meetings:

- **Delegates** from countries who are part of the convention are generally called "Parties". They wear a pink badge.
- **Observers:** Any other organization, from an NGO to a company, to a city. They are organized in different groupings called "constituencies", for example for youth, farmers, women, or industry. They wear a yellow badge. The observers have a key role at the conference because they organize side events that highlight important issues. This is the space where the civil society gets to make their demands clear and show their activism work.
- **Press:** journalists from around the world come to cover the climate conference. They wear an orange badge.


### 1.3 How does the UNFCCC work?

There are several types of meetings taking place at COPs, with different people allowed to attend. The UNFCCC secretariat makes decisions based on the consensus of all parties.



### 1.4 Negotiating Groups

While each party is allowed to negotiate individually, parties generally work through groupings to establish common negotiating goals and strengthen their positions.





**ANNEX 1**

**Umbrella Group:** formed after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. They drafted a calling for cuts in carbon dioxide emissions of 20% from 1990 levels by 2005

**EIG:** Environmental Integrity Group.

**United States of America**

**NON-ANNEX Countries**

**G77+ China:** Biggest group, consists of 134 countries

**ALBA:** the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America

**BASIC:** Brazil, South Africa, China India

**LMDCs:** Like Minded-Group of Developing Countries

**AILAC:** the Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean

**LDCs:** 46 Parties defined as Least Developed Countries

**AOSIS:** Alliance of Small Island States

In this part, the most important steps in the history of the COP will be reviewed with some details related to these steps. For a summary of all COPs, please refer to Annex I.

You can read more about each group [here: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings](https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings)

## 1.5 History of COPs

### Kyoto Protocol

In 1995, countries started negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate change, which by 1997, Kyoto Protocol (KP) was adopted.

KP main objective is to urge developed countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases from different sectors, towards achieving the goal of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere), as the protocol obligates each developed country to reduce its emissions by 5.2% below year levels 1990 by 2012 (But in fact, global emissions rose by nearly 40% from 1990 to 2009).

Kyoto Protocol establishes top-down legally binding emissions reduction targets for developed nations only, while the Paris Agreement requires all countries to do their part in greenhouse gas emissions reduction.

The Protocol entered into force in 2005 after the completion of the legal quorum stipulated in the protocol with the ratification of 55 countries whose total emissions represent 55% of the world's total emissions.

The Protocol's first commitment period began in 2008 and ended in 2012. The second commitment period began in 2013 and ended in 2020. There are currently 192 ratified Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

The Protocol established a number of mechanisms to assist developed countries in achieving their commitments to reduce their emissions, and those mechanisms are; the clean development mechanism (reducing emissions in developing countries), the joint implementation mechanism (reducing emissions in another developed country), emissions trading (exchange of certified emission reduction between different parties).

## Doha Amendment

Countries adopted an amendment (Doha Amendment) to the Kyoto Protocol's 2nd commitment period. The amendment has been ratified by 112 countries and entered into force in 2020 with the ratification of 144 party.

The Protocol did not succeed in implementing its objectives for the withdrawal of the United States, and many developed countries failed to implement their commitments or entering a second commitment period from 2012-2020. Canada withdrew in 2011 and Japan announced that they will not fulfill their obligations after the Fukushima crisis.

The developed and developing countries attempted to blame each other for the Protocol's failure. The failure of the Protocol, according to developing countries, is due to the United States' refusal to ratify and adhere to its pledges, which led to the rest of the developed countries failing to follow their commitments, along with the lack of a clear mechanism to ensure developed countries' compliance with their obligations. Additionally, the developed countries believe the BRICS group, led by China, Brazil, and India in particular, has profited from the proceeds of selling emissions reduction certificates from some type of projects such as wind farms, that do not require additional financing and are able to attract investors and achieve their objectives which is thus against CDM additionality condition.

## Paris Agreement

The Paris Agreement is an implementation modality within the UNFCCC to help achieve its objectives.

- During COP21 in Paris, the UNFCCC parties reached a "historical" agreement to combat climate change and to accelerate and strengthen the required policies and investments towards achieving a sustainable low-carbon future.
- Paris Agreement brought all nations together for the first time to commit to ambitious steps battling climate change and adapting to its effects, while also enhancing support for developing countries to do so.
- On April 22, 2016, on the occasion of Earth Day, 175 world leaders signed the Paris Agreement at the United Nations headquarters in New York. This was the single-day record for the most countries signing an international agreement. The Agreement came into force (and so became fully effective) as more than 55 nations accepted the Agreement, accounting for at least 55 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.
- Main objective is; "Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C" while increasing the ability to adapt to adverse impacts of climate change with ensuring the consistency of finance flows.
- Paris Agreement established a mechanism to review parties' commitments every five years to ensure that the temperature target is being met;
- Developed countries also, committed themselves to mobilize \$100 billion annually to assist developing

countries mitigate (reduce) their emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change through different financial mechanisms such as “Green Climate Fund”.

- Until date, there has been a lack of clarity on how to achieve certain agreement’s aims, and there have been disparities in interpretation of these goals between developed and developing countries, such as the adaptation global goal.
- Developed countries have not yet met their financial commitments and are attempting to postpone them to 2025 instead of 2020

**Key facts about the Paris Agreement**

Entered into force on 4 November 2016	Signed by 195 parties out of 197	Ratified by 191 parties out of 197
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*The countries that have not ratified yet are Iran, Turkey, Eritrea, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen*

## 1.6 Key Elements of the Paris Agreement

### *Preamble:*

Its Preamble sets the framework in which the Agreement has to be implemented:

*“Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of ... people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity.”*

**Some of the main articles under the Paris Agreement are:**


### NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS (PA Art. 3)

NDCs are one of the key mechanisms of the Paris Agreement. They are the national plans that countries have to submit regularly to communicate their ambition in fighting climate change.

The plans can include information on the work being done on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. Those plans have to be submitted regularly (every 5 years) and should represent a progression of climate ambition.

**Timeline: How countries plan to raise the ambition of their climate pledges**

The Paris “ratchet mechanism” is designed to steadily increase ambition over time, ensuring that the world reaches net zero emissions in the second half of the century and keeps temperature rise “well below 2C”.



NDCs should contain specific information when they are presented by countries, specifically:

When reporting on mitigation, NDCs should include reference points, periods for implementation, scope and coverage, planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches (including estimating and accounting for greenhouse gas emissions and removals), fairness, among others.

When reporting on adaptation, NDC communications are more flexible and can include: national adaptation priorities, support needed, implementation of adaptation plans, gender-responsiveness of the actions, and indigenous and local knowledge related to adaptation.

So far there is no agreement yet on “common timeframes” (PA Art. 4.10) for submitting NDCs, and this has been postponed to 2030. Before that time, countries can keep their current pledges but are encouraged to update their NDC by 2020 with more ambitious goals and to follow the guidelines defined.

## MITIGATION (PA Art. 4)

- “Emissions reporting, progress towards meeting climate pledges, adaptation, climate impacts and climate finance provided or received” (no concrete date)
- Achieve emissions neutrality in the second half of the century
- Developed countries will lead with economy-wide emissions reduction, developing countries will enhance their mitigation efforts over time, depending on national circumstances

## MARKETS MECHANISMS (PA Art. 6)

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows parties to consider cooperative approaches to reach their climate goals, which can be achieved through market or non-market mechanisms. The two key elements of this article are:

- Article 6.2: Governs cooperative approaches between Parties. This essentially sets the rules on how future carbon credits will be exchanged, transferred, and accounted for.
- Article 6.4: Establishes a market-based mechanism that will enable the reduction of emissions from project and system-based activities.

## ADAPTATION (PA Art. 7)

- Develop adaptive capacity, enhance resilience, reduce vulnerability
- Parties should strengthen their cooperation on adaptation actions, taking into account the Cancun Adaptation Framework

## LOSS AND DAMAGE (PA Art. 8)

- Adverting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage caused by extreme weather events or slow onset events
- COP Decision agreed L&D does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation
- Parties and UN agencies are encouraged to cooperate and give support: e.g. through early warning systems, insurances, financial support, etc.

## FINANCE (PA Art. 9)

- Developed countries provide financial resources to assist developing countries
- Establishing a balance between mitigation and adaptation
- Before 2025: new financial target
- Developed countries will have to communicate their financial support every 2 years (biannual financial reports - indicative quantitative and qualitative info).

## TRANSPARENCY (PA Art. 13)

- The transparency framework (PA Art. 13) is designed as one comprehensive set of communication guidelines, and allows countries to be “flexible” for “those developing country parties that need it in the light of their capacities”. Therefore, this flexibility is self-determined.
- It covers several types of information that Parties will have to communicate, including:
  - emissions reporting
  - progress towards meeting climate pledges
  - adaptation and climate impacts
  - climate finance provided or received.

## GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (PA Art. 14)

The Global Stocktake (scheduled for 2023) will consist of three main parts: information collection, technical assessment and consideration of outputs. The thematic areas that will be discussed include mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation and support. But also can consider issues related to response measures, loss and damage.

## 1.7 Conference of the Parties - COP26

- UNFCCC COP26 was held in Glasgow, Scotland, between 31 of October to 12<sup>th</sup> of November, 2021, under the joint presidency of the United Kingdom and Italy.

- The climate negotiations were held in Glasgow at a difficult time due to the Corona pandemic and its impacts on the international economy, making it one of the most difficult international negotiations globally.
- Two Arab countries, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, were chosen to host the upcoming 27 and 28 conferences of the parties to the Agreement, respectively.
- The main negotiation were related to the rules of carbon markets (PA Article 6) with a main outcome called "Glasgow Climate Pact", summary of the pact is detailed hereunder ([https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3\\_auv\\_2\\_cover%20decision.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_2_cover%20decision.pdf))

## Science and urgency

"The pact recognizes the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policymaking; while welcoming the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report. Expressing utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1 °C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region, and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted. Focuses on equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances; also ensuring the urgency of enhancing ambition and action in relation to mitigation, adaptation and finance in this critical decade to address the gaps in the implementation of the goals of the Paris Agreement".

## Adaptation

"Notes with serious concern the findings from the contribution of Working Group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, including that climate and weather extremes and their adverse impacts on people and nature will continue to increase with every additional increment of rising temperatures; Emphasizes the urgency of scaling up action and support, including finance, capacity-building and technology transfer, to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change in line with the best available science, taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties; Welcomes the adaptation communications and national adaptation plans submitted to date, which enhance the understanding and implementation of adaptation actions and priorities; Urges Parties to further integrate adaptation into local, national and regional planning; Recognizes the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, and welcomes the launch of the comprehensive two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation; Notes that the implementation of the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme will start immediately after the third session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; and Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to present to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fourth session the findings from the contribution of Working Group II to its Sixth Assessment Report, including those relevant to assessing adaptation needs, and calls upon the research community to further the understanding of global, regional and local impacts of climate change, response options and adaptation needs".

## Adaptation finance

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“The current provision of climate finance for adaptation remains insufficient to respond to worsening climate change impacts in developing country Parties; thus, developed country Parties to urgently and significantly scale up their provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for adaptation so as to respond to the needs of developing country Parties as part of a global effort, including for the formulation and implementation of national adaptation plans and adaptation communications; Recognizes the importance of the adequacy and predictability of adaptation finance, including the value of the Adaptation Fund in delivering dedicated support for adaptation, and invites developed country Parties to consider multi-annual pledges; Welcomes the recent pledges made by many developed country Parties to increase their provision of climate finance to support adaptation in developing country Parties in response to their growing needs, including contributions made to the Adaptation Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, which represent significant progress compared with previous efforts; Urges developed country Parties to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources, Calls upon multilateral development banks, other financial institutions and the private sector to enhance finance mobilization in order to deliver the scale of resources needed to achieve climate plans, particularly for adaptation, and encourages Parties to continue to explore innovative approaches and instruments for mobilizing finance for adaptation from private sources”.

## Mitigation

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“Recognizes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at the temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C and resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C; Recognizes that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C requires rapid, deep and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 % by 2030 relative to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as well as deep reductions in other greenhouse gases; Also recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty; Notes with serious concern the findings of the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement, according to which the aggregate greenhouse gas emission level, taking into account implementation of all submitted nationally determined contributions, is estimated to be 13.7 per cent above the 2010 level in 2030; Emphasizes the urgent need for Parties to increase their efforts to collectively reduce emissions Calls upon Parties to accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phase-out of unabated coal power and inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, recognizing the need for support towards a just transition; Invites Parties to consider further actions to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions, including methane; Emphasizes the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystems to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal, including through



forests and other terrestrial and marine ecosystems acting as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and by protecting biodiversity, while ensuring social and environmental safeguards; and recognizes that enhanced support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their actions”.

## Finance, technology transfer and capacity-building for mitigation and adaptation

“Developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, the need of developing country Parties, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness as a consequence of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic; to mobilize climate finance from all sources to reach the level needed to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, including significantly increasing support for developing country Parties, beyond USD 100 billion per year goal which has not yet been met;, and welcomes the increased pledges made by many developed country Parties and the Climate Finance Delivery Plan and emphasizes the challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing finance and encourages further efforts to enhance access to finance, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism”.

## Loss and damage

“Acknowledges that climate change has already caused and will increasingly cause loss and damage and that, as temperatures rise, impacts from climate and weather extremes, as well as slow onset events, will pose an ever-greater social, economic and environmental threat; Reiterates the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects; and urges developed country Parties, the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, United Nations entities and intergovernmental organizations and other bilateral and multilateral institutions, including non-governmental organizations and private sources, to provide enhanced and additional support for activities addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”.

## Implementation

“Move swiftly with the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and the start of the global stocktake, while welcoming with appreciation the completion of the Paris Agreement work programme, including the adoption of decisions on Common time frames for nationally determined contributions, methodological issues relating to the enhanced transparency framework for action and support, Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Articles 4 and 7 paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement, Guidance on cooperative approaches, Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism

established by Article 6, Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches, Recognizes the need to take into consideration the concerns of Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly developing country Parties (Such as Arab Countries that its economy depends on Petroleum), Also recognizes the need to ensure just transitions that promote sustainable development and eradication of poverty, and the creation of decent work and quality jobs, including through making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emission and climate-resilient development, including through deployment and transfer of technology, and provision of support to developing country Parties”.

## Collaboration

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“The need to close the gaps in implementation towards the goals of the Paris Agreement, Recognizes the importance of international collaboration on innovative climate action, including technological advancement, across all actors of society, Also recognizes the important role of non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, indigenous peoples, local communities, youth, children, local and regional governments and other stakeholders, Welcomes the improvement of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action for enhancing ambition, Urges Parties to swiftly begin implementing the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment, respecting, promoting and considering their respective obligations on human rights, as well as gender equality and empowerment of women; Also urges Parties and stakeholders to ensure meaningful youth participation in decision making process, Emphasizes the important role of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ in designing and implementing climate action; ensure gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation, which are vital for raising ambition and achieving climate goals; Invites the relevant work programmes and constituted bodies under the UNFCCC to consider how to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action in their existing mandates and workplans and to report on these activities within the existing reporting processes, as appropriate”.

In addition to the formal negotiation, several voluntary declarations were announced and agreed upon, some of which include:

### U.S.-China Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s

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The declaration of the two largest emitters to collaborate was a positive sign, even though the declaration contained no new pledges, as it stated the same pledges previously announced, whether in terms of financing or plans to reduce GHG emissions, however, the good news is that the two parties have begun to collaborate on climate action, which could lead to more future promising outcomes that contribute to achieving the Paris Agreement goals, particularly the global temperature goal.

### The Global Methane Pledge

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More than 100 countries have agreed to reduce methane emissions by 30 % in 2030; although the declaration is not binding, it gives a strong signal, especially due to the fact that methane has a high global warming potential of 23 times that of carbon dioxide.

### Glasgow Leaders' Declaration On Forests And Land Use

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Many of the sideline declarations at COP26 were a letdown, but the one on deforestation has the potential to make a difference. Unlike some other declarations, the forest declaration was signed by 141 nations, including significant actors like as Russia, China, Brazil, and Congo from developing countries, as well as the US and Canada from industrialized ones. Many experts, however, criticized the declaration since it allows countries 10 years until 2030 to cease deforestation, arguing that this is a rather lengthy amount of time during which a great deal of cutting and damage of the world's lungs might occur.

### Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero

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Over 450 of the world's banks and financial institutions (an alliance of banks, mutual funds, investment funds, and insurance companies) signed the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) and committed to decarbonise their investments. It is expected this will lead to a carbon-neutral business with assets of \$130 trillion by mid-century. This proves the importance of the financial institutions in leading climate change action. However, of the top ten banks, six banks are not on the signatory list –some of them are Chinese banks provide finance for coal activities (China Construction Bank and China Merchants Bank) in addition to other US banks such as Bank of America.



Chapter 2

# The Arab States at COP























## 2.1 General Background

The Arab States is one of the main negotiation groups at the UNFCCC negotiations. It is made up of 22 Arab Countries which are the same members as the Arab League. Some facts about the group:

- Saudi Arabia is the leader of the group and it speaks on behalf of the group at all main plenaries
- The group meets before each UN Climate meetings such as at the COP, SBSTA and SBI to discuss their positions. The meetings usually happen at the HQ of the League of Arab States in Cairo.
- The group meets on a daily basis at COP for debriefing and strategizing on their positions (meeting is closed to party badge holders only)
- The Arab group has lead negotiators divided across each negotiation session to represent its position and demands.
- A group lead negotiator will always begin their first intervention by saying "This is X country speaking on behalf of X Group". (i.e "This is Saudi Arabia speaking on behalf on the Arab League)

It is important to note that countries can be part of more than one group. All of the Arab States members are part of other groups such as the African Group and the G77+China group.

**Arab States Members**

 Algeria	 Iraq	 Morocco	 Saudi Arabia	 United Arab Emirates
 Bahrain	 Jordan	 Mauritania	 Somalia	
 Comoros	 Kuwait	 Oman	 Sudan	 Yemen
 Djibouti	 Lebanon	 Palestine	 Syria	
 Egypt	 Libya	 Qatar	 Tunisia	

Arab states status in Paris Agreement

- 18 Arab countries have signed and ratified the Paris Agreement
- Libya, Yemen, and Iraq are yet to ratify it

## 2.2 Arab States position at Paris Agreement

As per the UNFCCC groups division, all of the Arab group countries fall under the Non-annex group and while the Arab Group members have different climate challenges and priorities at the UNFCCC. They work together to come up with a shared vision that meets all the member's goals.

The Arab Group, overall, emphasizes the need for Annex I countries to lead on the emission reduction process due to their historical responsibility, and to commit to and increase their financial pledges to adaptation and mitigation initiatives for Non-Annex countries. All decisions and negotiations must comply with the principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement, be party-driven, inclusive and transparent, and adhere to the principles of justice, fairness, and common but differentiated responsibilities, while rejecting unilateral actions in addressing climate change issues.

A balance must be maintained between climate action and the support provided, taking into account the national conditions of developing countries. The group also emphasizes that climate action must target emissions, not sources, and include all greenhouse gases as well as all solutions and technologies in a holistic and complete manner without discrimination. In addition, the ambition is not limited to mitigation issues, but also includes issues of adaptation and means of implementation. The following section clarifies specific details related to the terms of the Agreement and the position of the group in general.

### NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTIONS (PA Art. 3)

*On the NDCs, the Arab States' position is:*

- While all countries should aim to have ambitious NDCs, the emphasis should be placed upon Annex countries to lead the road.
- NDCs should not only focus on mitigation and that all aspects of climate change should be included.

This year, countries were asked to submit the updated NDCs ahead of the COP26 meeting and so far, only 16 Arab countries have submitted updated NDCs ahead of and during COP26. The countries are Bahrain, Comoros, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen.

(for more information see Annex 2).

### MITIGATION (PA Art. 4)

On Article 4, The Arab States emphasizes the importance of providing space for developing countries in undertaking any type of enhanced mitigation efforts (including relative emission reduction targets which are economy-wide and non-economy-wide actions) over time. This is particularly important for the oil and gas producers in the Arab States because a massive shift away from fossil fuels would have negative impacts on their economies and therefore, such countries need time to tackle the challenge of diversifying economies in response to mitigation actions.

Overall, The Arab States wants the nature of the mitigation efforts to be differentiated between developed

and developing countries, reflecting the existing provisions of the Convention that are based on historical responsibility and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR). Characteristics and information must also be included in the existing national contributions and there should be flexibility in the guidelines (contributions in the context of sustainable development), in addition to emphasizing and ensuring a strong link between actions and support.

## Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)

CBDR is a principle within the UNFCCC that acknowledges the different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate change.

## MARKETS MECHANISMS (PA Art. 6)

The Arab States position on Article 6:

- Article 6 needs to be just and should not provide ways for developed countries to put pressure on developing countries
- The flexibility with regard to technical requirements for participation in Article 6 activities including the need to respect the diversity of NDCs such as contributions based on policies and measures, non-GHG metrics, baselines and reporting.
- Call for comprehensive decision for article 6 and its sub items 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8 as one package.
- The use of Article 6 mechanisms is not limited to NDCs.
- Use bottom-up approach and allow differentiation in collaborative approaches.
- The equal discount to be applied only to internationally transferred mitigation units resulting from activities included in the NDCs only.
- Allowing the benefit of the clean development mechanism emissions reduction units issued before the year 2020 in the host country NDCs.
- The necessity of adopting a program to support and build the capacities of developing countries to enable their participation in the mechanisms of Article 6.
- Article 6 needs to apply Share of Proceeds under both 6.2 and 6.4 (not just 6.4). This will help cover the administrative costs but also allow for more funds to flow into the Adaptation fund which is a key tool for the Arab States and all developing countries
- Key lessons from the Clean Development Mechanism under Kyoto Protocol must be learned and incorporated into the design of markets system.

## Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund (AF) was established in 2001 to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in developing countries Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

## Share of Proceeds

A levy that is placed on trades (under Article 6) and is used to cover the overall administrative purposes and to replenish the Adaptation Fund which provides support to vulnerable countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change.

### ADAPTATION (PA Art. 7)

The Arab region's environment is highly vulnerable to rising temperatures, sea-level rise, and increased risks of floods and droughts. This makes adaptation one of the key issues for the Arab States at the UNFCCC. The group had been pushing for a long-term goal or vision on adaptation to ensure that there is parity between adaptation and mitigation and to avoid having only a mitigation centric-goal.

Overall, the Arab States supports the establishment of an online registry, similar to the NDC registry, where parties will be able to submit and periodically update their Adaptation Communications. The group also emphasizes the importance of predictable adaptation finance, and the need for developed countries to continue and increase their support for adaptation initiatives in developing countries through the available tools such as the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). In general, the Arab States group call for:

- The need to define the global goal for adaptation and develop methodologies to achieve it (to activate Article 7 of the Paris Agreement).
- The necessity of activating adaptation measures and linking them with the global goal.
- Comprehensiveness and organization of adaptation communications and provision of support for their preparation, taking into account the quality of adaptation measures.
- The importance of mitigation co-benefits associated with adaptation and economic diversification. Use bottom-up approach and allow differentiation in collaborative approaches.
- NDCs are the main vehicle for adaptation communications.

## Adaptation Communications

It was established by Article 7, paragraphs 10 & 11 in Paris Agreement. Each Party should submit and update periodically an adaptation communication, which includes information on its priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions.

## Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The GCF is a fund established within the framework of the UNFCCC as an operating entity of the Financial Mechanism to assist developing countries in adaptation and mitigation practices to counter climate change.

## LOSS AND DAMAGE (PA Art. 8)

The Arab Group supports the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) Executive committee which focuses on multiple pillars including:

- Explore modalities for supporting existing risk transfer facilities and fostering the development and/or expansion of risk transfer facilities.
- Establishing a capacity-building program to address the capacity constraints of developing country Parties in their efforts to avert and minimize loss and damage.
- Conduct a gap analysis, at the national and international level, in relation to finance, technology and capacity-building, and explore modalities and provide recommendations on how to address the gaps identified.

## Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM)

A Mechanism established at COP19 (2013) to address Loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate.



## FINANCE (PA Art. 9)

The Arab States position on Article 9:

- Request developed countries to meet their pledges of providing \$100 billion annually to developing and least developed countries. The necessity of activating adaptation measures and linking them with the global goal.
- Developed countries need to commit to their financial pledges and ensure transparency in the submitted biannual financial report.
- Funding should be based on grants, not loans, and facilitate its accessibility procedures.
- Increasing and accelerating financial flows from Annex I countries and allocating the necessary funding to address loss and damage as a critical component of the global response to climate change.
- Providing appropriate and adequate funding and equitable distribution of technology and supporting capacity building for developing countries, especially Arab countries.
- Raising the level of financial support provided by developed countries to finance mitigation and adaptation measures, with a significant increase in adaptation financing compared to current levels.
- Ensuring a just and equal distribution of finances among the most affected.
- Balance financial support between adaptation and mitigation.
- Transforming climate finance needs into actual actions, overcoming the obstacles that prevent it, and enhancing the access of developing countries to the necessary finance.
- Financial flows must be consistent with the trajectory of declining greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation activities to climate change.

## TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (PA Art. 10)

For the Arab States, technology transfer is an important element in the UN climate negotiations. It plays a critical role in the effective global response to the climate change challenges and allows the countries in the region to benefit from technologies available in the developed countries.

The Arab States position on Article Technology Transfer:

- Article 10 is currently only theoretical. Developed countries must support the full and direct transfer of technology to developing countries. This is yet to happen.
- The Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN) has poor performance and limited financial resources. So far, it has provided limited technical support that has nothing to do with implementation on the ground.
- Developing countries need to be consistently supported in developing their Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) which will help them identify the priorities and investment opportunities.

## The Climate Technology Centre & Network (CTCN)

The operational arm of the UNFCCC Technology Mechanism, hosted by the UN Environment Programme and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The Centre promotes the accelerated transfer of environmentally sound technologies for low carbon and climate-resilient development at the request of developing countries.

## Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs)

A set of country-driven activities that identify the climate change mitigation and adaptation technology priorities of partner countries, and work towards producing a pipeline of investment projects.

### TRANSPARENCY (PA Art. 13)

The Transparency Framework article mentions that developing countries can be “flexible” in their reporting.

The Arab Group’s position is that the flexibilities mentioned in the text should be provided to developing countries in a systemic nature, meaning that it is integrated into the entire transparency regime and reflected in terms of scope of reporting, frequency, level and detail of reporting. With regard to the group’s position, it is as follows:

- The transparency framework should recognize the national nature and overall scope of the defined contributions.
- Flexibility should be applied on regular basis to the transparency framework, while avoiding undermining and limiting the flexibility towards developing countries ensuring that disclosure of schedules and designs does not cause extra burden on developing countries.
- Avoid discussing the interrelationship between Article 6 and transparency (77d in the Principles and Guidelines) until after the Article 6 negotiations have concluded, in order to avoid prejudgment.
- The need to provide means of support and capacity-building for developing countries in preparation for the requirements of the improved transparency framework in 2024.
- That transparency mechanisms should respect national sovereignty.



## GLOBAL STOCKTAKE (PA Art. 14)

The Arab Group position on the global stocktake include:

- Ensuring a delicate balance amongst all of the themes: including Mitigation, Adaptation, Means of Implementation, and others. Also considering important areas such as adaptation-mitigation co-benefits and economic diversification.
- The Global Stocktake should remain to be an aggregation of the efforts of countries, as opposed to an accounting of NDCs, or questioning of specific countries' efforts or ambitions
- The global stocktake should also be inclusive in terms of the sources of its inputs. This may include the IPCC, academia, voluntary inputs from parties, and different international agencies.
- The global stocktake process should be comprehensive and facilitative, in light of equity and common but differentiated responsibility and based on the best available science (identifying support gaps)
- The global stock take should include all topics of adaptation and mitigation and means of implementation.



## Chapter 3


# Political, Environmental, Social, Technological, Economical, Legal (PESTEL) Analysis of the Mitigation and Adaptation in the Arab States and how it reflects on the Climate Negotiations and Energy Transition

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## 3.1 Introduction

The optimization of the Arab states' mitigation and adaptation strategies in all its aspects play a significant role in the energy transition, climate action, and enhancing the commitments of the Arab states towards its climate targets. In that regard, this chapter intends to construct a strategic paradigm that identifies the key dimensions influencing the adaptation and mitigation strategies within the Arab region in two ways (opportunities, threats). Additionally, this will help to touch upon the incompatibilities existing between the Arab states, and how these could be overcome and transformed into interlinkages that allow for better coordination, collective negotiations, and therefore effective climate action on the regional level.

This assessment was conducted based on ad-hoc interviews with energy, environment, and climate experts from all the geographical areas in the Arab region (Levant, North Africa and Sudan, Gulf Cooperation Countries) representing the public, private, and civil society sectors (Annex 3).



## 3.2 PESTEL Opportunities and Threats

### 3.2.1 Opportunities on the political level

**Effective governance and formulation of policies** have been considered one of the greatest opportunities for both mitigation and adaptation agendas. On the mitigation, the Arab states will benefit from it in the upcoming energy transition phases. It has been indicated by the majority of the interviewed experts that the established strategies, institutional frameworks, and policies in the Levant, North Africa, and the GCC region have founded the grassroots for politicians and decision-makers to be more aware of the energy transition importance. On adaptation, the majority of the Arab states have decent to well-established adaptation programs and policies. However, the upcoming phase of climate action requires more transformation of policies on papers to real action plans and execution programs, to ensure the effective implementation of the pre-set targets. In addition, experts indicated that the Arab region needs better leadership in its context more than administration and management. This shall reflect on more trust between the nations and their governments, as well as create a shared vision towards the future developmental plans.

**Political collaboration for innovation.** The states in the Arab region have diverse sets of lifestyles, constitutional paradigms, and political orientations. However, it is crucial to note that they share the same language, cultural thoughts, historical overlaps, profoundly shared natural resources, and energy potentials. This must constantly be stressed to the political leaders in the region, to look at and collaborate towards better innovative and integrative solutions for the Arab region.

**Wiser public relations campaigns.** The spread of false information and miscommunication between governments and the public has been widely affecting pillars of trust and increasing the gaps within the political civic engagement. Here, comes the opening window for improvement, which could be in form of wise and well-designed public relations campaigns on both national and regional levels to modify the climate adaptation and mitigation narratives that guide the public towards the sustainability concepts, the customer-roles in preserving the ecosystems they are part of, and creating public-driven solutions through an effective participatory approach led by the political entities and policymakers.

### 3.2.2 Threats on the political level

**Wars, political conflicts, disagreements, and the absence of decent political systems** have extremely affected the stability of the region and highly impacted the socio-economic needs of the Arab nations and their abilities to adapt to climate change impacts. The escalation of these political clashes has already caused the destruction of large energy and environmental infrastructure. Furthermore, this political instability, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya triggered the alarm of danger of demolishing livelihoods and abandoning human rights. This puts those countries at an even greater risk of climate impacts and extremely lower adaptation mechanisms. Additionally, this will also keep preventing these countries and their neighboring ones from having sustainable, secure, and affordable energy transition besides correct assessment of climate needs.

**Centralism, state-owned capitalism, and lack of democracy** in the majority of the Arab states can be considered as a high threat to the Arab region. The vulnerability created from the slow initiation of public-private partnerships, engagement of the civil society actors in the decision-making process, as well as the governance models based on ensuring short-term security rather than sustainability, will keep raising concerns to the development of the Arab nations adaptation and mitigation strategies. Unless this approach is left behind while considering the cruciality of privatization, customer-centric business models, and serious engagement to the civic actors, the region will not be able to advance under the climate agenda.

**Governmental officials still lack strong technical backgrounds in the mitigation and adaptation fields, as well as the high turnover in the higher-up positions,** are still creating many threats to the stability and continuity of the initiated programmes, especially in the energy sector, which requires first and foremost, long-term planning coupled with continuous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms on the development phases of all the energy transition stages. This lack of technical expertise also impacts the implementation of adaptation programs and locks the potential of securing funding from climate financial entities such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Green Environment Facility (GEF).

**Unhealthy political competitiveness and greenwashing** have been highlighted by the interviewed experts as the main threats to the Arab region's mitigation strategies and especially in the energy systems. The disclosure of information and transparency manners needs more strengthening in a holistic approach within the political structures, regardless of solely focusing on being successful in achieving the climate targets and accomplishing the pre-set energy transition plans since this will create better regional collaboration and openings of integration.

### 3.2.3 Opportunities on the economic level

**Mitigation and Adaptation have a great cost, but there are plenty of financial resources!** The availability and interest of many international donors, investment banks, and development agencies to support the Arab region in being more proactive in their climate actions have increased in the past decade in terms of the opportunities provided, in addition to their quality and impact. Moreover, many of the developing countries in the region are largely benefiting from international funds after the Paris Agreement, which eases the process and raises the financial resources to help developing countries in implementing their energy transition plans as well as their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). This ensures more commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in addition to promoting sustainable economic development.

**Decarbonisation and carbon management are the new economic growth opportunities for the Oil and Gas sectors in the region.** The majority, if not all the Arab states whether net importers or net exporters, are still heavily dependent on the conventional energy resources for their energy supply and as their national treasuries' main source of revenue. Therefore, continuing in the "business as usual" model will raise alarming concerns about the aspects of financial sustainability in the long term. In our interviews, experts have highlighted the importance to redesign the business models of the oil and gas producers and consumers to be integrative with the promising deep decarbonization and carbon management mechanisms such as; Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS), Energy Efficiency and Conservation, Circular Economy, etc. Henceforth, ensuring better economic growth and financial attraction to the foreign investments and investment banks but in a sustainable context by all its means.

**Post COVID-19 green recovery and the transformation to privatization and PPPs.** The lockdowns and curfews in 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 have been harsh and devastating to all the states in the Arab region with continuous pandemic waves of the COVID-19 disease. It is predicted to leave deep scars on the economic situations of the states due to the high rate of compensations and stimulus packages provided by the governments to all the economic sectors, as well as the high loss coming from the shortages that occurred within the various energy supply chains. Therefore, it has been indicated by the pool of experts that the recovery phase should adopt new modalities to move with privatization trends, with a strong public-private partnership to stimulate better recovery. This trend should take into serious consideration the importance to be aligned and synchronized with green growth, clean recovery, and diversified economy pillars, especially through catalyzing the financing mechanisms towards green bonds, loans, sukuks, and funds, green fiscal reforms, revamping investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, and leveraging accessibility to sustainable private investments and local manufacturing initiatives. This should be done under a well-established framework of transparency, disclosure of information within the region, as well as clearer and less complicated investment processes.

### 3.2.4 Threats on the economic level

**Lack of climate-related insurance policies preparedness.** The escalating and accelerated risks arising from the consequence of the climate change challenges are foreseen as key threats to energy investments and developers in the region, considering the global scenarios predicting the south of the Mediterranean and the Gulf Countries region to be from the most affected by the severity of climate events. Hence, the interviewed experts stressed to carefully examine the response to upcoming climate risks by working side by side with the insurance companies to develop well-prepared and resilient insurance policies for the energy supply and demand sectors.

**The path towards energy transition and sustainability is still planned in an uninclusive and disempowering way.** This is especially crucial for Oil and Gas producers considering them key financial enablers. Leaving them behind will create more uncertainties that cannot be ignored. Moreover, the carbon pricing schemes targeting Oil and Gas producers only, without including the consumers of the oil and gas as well, is another key threat to implementing a good practice of the energy transition and sustainability. In that regard, inclusiveness, fairness, leaving no one behind, and adopting a shared economic responsibility by all are what should be looked at in the upcoming days.

**Unjustified and unnecessary public subsidies can discourage the private sector entities** in the energy sector from being more creative and innovative in creating long-term sustainable solutions, which eventually will keep increasing the burdens on the national budgets and prevent the public from sensing the value of long-term mitigation strategies and how they are hindered by such subsidies.

### 3.2.5 Opportunities on the social level

**Redesigning educational systems to be more comprehensive and inclusive to climate action and energy transition.** With high literacy rates in the majority of the Arab region's states and the quantity and quality of young, educated people, this region has a very promising opportunity to improve its environmental education frameworks and content. The interviewed experts highlighted that primary education along with undergraduate and graduate programmes need to be improved and redesigned. In addition, the opportunity here, is to integrate more the socio-economic aspects of the mitigation and adaptation, not only the technical know-how and the systems engineering.

**Adaptation and mitigation strategies are a matter of life or death to some Arab nations.** On mitigation, renewable energy technologies have become a necessity for better livelihoods and quality of life, not only as a source of energy supply contributing to the final energy mix in some countries. Taking for example, Yemen, Syria, and Palestine, the increase of photovoltaic and solar thermal systems is actually the first step to have decent livelihoods, better food quality through supporting cooking and agriculture, as well as better accessibility to healthcare units. The importance of this opportunity is very high in terms of preserving human rights in these areas, and an opportunity for other countries in the region to collaborate in their infrastructure reconstruction and survival. On adaptation, early warning systems would save countless lives by helping communities prepare for hazardous climate-related events such as the floods in Sudan and fires in Lebanon and Algeria.



**Increasing job opportunities and employment by improving capacity building.** This is a key indicator that all the countries in the region are working on to reduce unemployment rates and improve the standards of life for their nations. Therefore, the expansion of sustainable energy projects, energy efficiency mechanisms and decarbonization fields, will be a huge opportunity for creating jobs across all value chains. However, this should be coupled with well-designed capacity, skill-building activities and programmes to all the qualification standard levels.

**Amplifying the grassroots efforts of environmental, climate, energy justice and equality.** In addition to getting grassroots organizers and activists to look more holistically, collaboratively, and in an integrative way to the wider picture, and design better awareness and advocacy programmes under this umbrella.

### 3.2.6 Threats on the social level

**The poor strengthening of the social safety nets of vulnerable groups from the impacts of climate change.** Marginalized communities are the most vulnerable to, and most affected by climate change, particularly in developing countries of the Levant, North Africa, and Yemen. Rather than leaving them behind, this necessitates more advocacy to raise awareness in these areas, as well as the development of special financial support schemes to ease their reachability and accessibility to adaptation programs and clean energy technologies. Furthermore, during and after wars and conflicts, there are many concerns of increasing the lack of social cohesion and a loss of identity within the social fabric. In Somalia for example, illegal armed groups such as Al-Shabaab have increasingly attracted young people due to the loss of identity and the limited job prospects. This can generate significant threats, which will be exacerbated by the effects of climate change.

**The growing gap in intergenerational dialogue and communication styles between generations,** resulting in a lock-in for actual sustainable development between activists, developers and those in charge of governance. In addition to the existing **high number of gender inequalities**, which are having a detrimental effect on energy transition and economic development.

**The uncompensated COVID-19 restrictions, as well as the failures of the medical and healthcare systems in some Arab states,** will extremely prevent any development in the social integration within energy transition and climate action pathways.

### 3.2.7 Opportunities on the technological level

**Local manufacturing and industrial production need to be more strengthened to include the core of the technology.** As a result, being able to improve technological innovation locally while also reducing brain drain to other parts of the world is advantageous. Particularly in areas of hydrogen production, agribusiness, water treatment and desalination, and digitization.

**The development of the public transportation infrastructure, and E-mobility systems** has been mentioned by the pool of experts as an imperative factor that will positively influence the energy systems in the upcoming years. This will reduce the demand on energy, activate energy conservation measures, as well as ease the process of adopting clean advanced technologies, due to the ease and low cost of constructing, operating and managing them in the region.

**The twin green-digital transition will be one of the greatest opportunities for the Arab region to utilize.** The importance of this transition will allow for the introduction of electricity smart metering systems, the development of virtual power plants and demand-side management techniques, the control and use of artificial intelligence applications in energy systems, and the reduction of the risks of potential cyber-attacks on national utility and renewable energy facilities.

**Renewable energy technologies have become much more mature and much less complex than before.** However, this will necessitate significant efforts to accelerate and expand their roll-out programmes across the Arab region, with the help of shared best practices and expertise among Arabs themselves, in addition to the integration with appropriate and sufficient storage systems.

**Improving resilience and developing disaster risk management systems** across the Arab nations by using shared technology from the developed countries. This will help improve national capacities in disaster preparedness and help to limit government data loss.

**Integrating Water Harvesting Technologies** To enable vulnerable rural populations in the Arab Nations to adapt to climate-induced water shortages by introducing innovative technologies for water harvesting techniques to improve water availability.

### 3.2.8 Threats on the technological level

**The progress of technological uptake is still behind what it should be in the Arab region** especially in the aspects of technology transfer, technology development and adopting new technological trends. This is primarily due to poor technology transfer to the region, and industrial countries' refusal to export their core technological knowledge. Furthermore, R&D is still constrained by the scarcity of advanced research mechanisms, research facilities and funds allocated for research, resulting in research efforts that are disconnected from market drivers.

**The lack of expertise to work with technologies in certain areas and to build local communities' capacity** to use them, is one of the key obstacles that adaptation and mitigation projects usually face when they are being implemented in Arab nations.

**Cybersecurity issues and malware attacks are considered one of the biggest threats** in terms of preserving the security of information and the safe operation of the energy systems in the Arab world. The threat here actually extends to the security of financial data and potential damages to the monitoring units within the energy facilities infrastructure. Therefore, this aspect should be revisited tactfully and very seriously to prevent any uncertainties from arising.

**The inflexibility of many of the electricity grids in the Arab region to absorb more renewable energy production,** is a huge threat that was highlighted by the experts. The electricity grids on transmission and distribution levels in several Arab states including; Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, etc., should be reinforced with upgraded transformers, lines and substations, with grids being integrated with new storage technologies and

off-grid solutions under well-designed electricity market regulations and financial feasibility, structured and managed under advanced grid management capabilities.

### 3.2.9 Opportunities on the environmental level

**Reinforcing the concepts of Water-Energy-Food nexus.** The serious water stress in the majority of the Arab states, the actual need to improve sustainable agriculture and farming mechanisms, and the importance of having the right balance between the aforementioned and the production of energy in the region, requires better harmonized policies and strategic plans between these sectors. This includes improving the collaboration and integration of projects between public, private and civil society actors to tackle all the pillars of the nexus. The opportunities lie mainly in the fields of using renewable energy for water and wastewater treatment, water conservation, as well as desalination projects and increasing energy efficiency and energy conservation measures in farming machinery and agri-chemicals manufacturing. In addition, scaling up the transformation to green buildings should be given priority.

**Wide-open and arid lands across the Arab region provide huge opportunities for increasing the number of clean and sustainable energy projects.** However, this should be considered carefully to avoid issues related to land erosion, biodiversity loss, and contaminating underground water that might be caused by the infrastructure implementation of energy projects.

### 3.2.10 Threats on the environmental level

**The misinterpretation of the environment by practitioners and policymakers as a constraint for development, not a prerequisite for it.** Any continuous adverse perspectives to environmental impact assessments, carbon emission limits requirements, as well as climate change adaptation and mitigation measures, will not enhance the projects' development in the Arab region. In fact, it will create more relaxed and unmonitored fossil fuel-based energy production and consumption practices.

**Waste from the energy transition are a serious threat in the future.** The strategic planning and proactive management of waste generated from the manufacturing, processing, construction, and storage of solar, wind, hydro, and biomass technologies should be planned well ahead of time and take into consideration at the early stages of supply chains, especially that some of the waste is considered hazardous. Not doing this will result in the suffering of the Arab region from serious environmental impacts in the future, created by the accumulation of waste and the lack of proper recycling mechanisms. One of the interviewees explained: "The transition is not only about people, but also about the environment. Without preserving the environment there will be no survival".

### 3.2.11 Opportunities on the legal level

**Signing and ratifying international climate treaties or agreements** can act as a strong driver to accelerate the establishment of new and better-designed local legal frameworks.

Activating the existing legislations of obligating the main polluters to pay compensation for their carbon emissions such as the upstream oil and gas industries, the heavy industrial facilities, as well as the fossil-based power generation plants. Moreover, tailoring the best international energy and climate-related legal enforcement practices to the context of the Arab region. This opportunity can avoid the lock-ins of having sophisticated laws and regulations in place, yet without proper strategies of enforcing them on the ground.

Power exchange trade agreements across the region can create huge potentials in terms of creating more investment stability and security. However, this should be accompanied by establishing legally separate regulatory bodies and entities, which enhance the management, monitoring and control of energy and environmental facilities, and build cross-regional trust between Arab states.

### 3.2.12 Threats on the legal level

Minimal engagement with stakeholders and the lack of participatory approach in many Arab states can reduce the trust between the law implementers and the legislators. This results in a denial of the law enforcement plans and creates a lack of responsibility towards framing and activating such legal frameworks.

The absence of obligatory climate targets and seriousness in enforcing the environmental regulations across the states of the Arab region will remain one of the biggest challenges in preventing accelerated, equitable and comprehensive energy transition and climate action.




### 3.3 The scale of Influence of the PESTEL Dimensions on the Arab States Energy Systems and Climate Negotiations


To assess the factors affecting the Arab region's adaptation and mitigation strategies in general and from a macro perspective, we asked the interviewed experts to scale the rate of influence of each dimension in the PESTEL list on the Arab region's strategies. It is worth noting that many of the experts mentioned the complexities and incompatibilities that exist between the various states of the Arab region. However, the key focus of our analysis, regardless of the incompatibilities and differences between the Arab states, was that there would still be common factors affecting them as a whole and showcasing that all the states are sharing several concerns, but on various levels of complexity and severity.

The figure below shows the average scale after analyzing the responses of the experts. It can be clearly seen that the experts were located in different geographical parts within the region, which highly affects their perspective when looking at energy systems and climate action. The highest rates were given to the Economic and Political factors as the main influencing factors on the different Arab states, again regardless of the level of complexity within the context of each country. Following that, the Social and Technological factors were seen in the second place of influence, which lead us to the result that the main drivers of better regional cooperation in the fields of climate mitigation and adaptation in the region should be mainly based on shared economic benefits, as well as an honest will and effective communication on higher political levels.

#### Influence of PESTEL Dimensions on the Arab States Energy Systems



In the next part of the analysis, the interviewed experts were asked to rank the PESTEL dimension in terms of their influence on the COP negotiations taking place annually. Again, the Political and Economic Dimensions were ranked on the top of the pyramid and the experts had nearly a consensus that they will continue to be the highest influencing factors to the Arab States Grouping. The below diagram illustrates the experts' perspectives towards the PESTEL dimension in terms of their influence on the Climate negotiations within the COPs.



## Chapter 4

# Recommendations

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- **There should be more collaboration between governments and civil society** in the field of the environment through better sharing of information regarding climate talks, policies and establishing more direct channels of communication.
- **Civil society organizations need to be supported by governments** and decision-makers to allow them to organize themselves into broad civil society networks to address climate change. This will help increase the level of environmental awareness across the Arab State Nations and allow the civil society in the region to take a leading role in climate action.
- **Ensure representation of networks and organizations in national councils and legislative institutions** in order to advocate for environmental issues and listen to the voice of youth and their demands. Civil society should be considered as a main stakeholder in the decision making.
- **Since COP27 and COP28 will be convened in the Arab region**, this will put a heavy burden on the two countries. Particularly in light of the globe's deteriorating economic situation and the world's current inflationary phase due to the Corona pandemic which highly impacted transportation, supply, and manufacturing chains in various parts of the world. As a result, developed countries' willingness to provide the means of implementation to developing countries in terms of funding, technology, and capacity-building to combat climate change has become increasingly questionable. Therefore, Arab think tanks must be engaged collaboratively in researching how the Arab region can benefit from hosting these two major events, whether in terms of raising awareness or setting up plans that serve the most vulnerable countries (Arab, African and LDCs) agendas to combat climate change impacts and safeguard life on our planet earth.
- **Climate Action needs to be accelerated.** Climate change impacts on the Arab States are undeniable, and the Arab States need to push for more climate action but also commit to local climate actions that don't require support from developed countries.
- **Climate change should be mainstreamed in all economic, social and political sectors.** Programs that address problems should be established, not just to diagnose what exists but how we can deal with it. This includes better coordination between ministries in addressing climate change elements in every policy and project.
- **The league of Arab States should have a developed and capable committee** of experts to assist countries in building the capacities of the Arab negotiators and facilitate better communication between them. There should be more consistency in the quality and quantity of delegations.
- **Policies need to be translated into real life.** Governments should not just work on fixing climate policies. They should work on implementation plans that ensure the translation of these policies into real action.

- **Women should be engaged in the different decision making process** that ranges from political, technical, economical as well as being lead negotiators at COPs.
- **The efforts of civil society movements in the Arab States should be harmonized**, and there should be work on regional projects that help raise awareness across different communities using different methods.
- **Government officials should not be viewed as the enemy** but rather partners for civil society. Civil society movements should work on developing plans on how governments can support them and in what specific ways.
- **There needs to be a stronger presence for the Arab States civil society movements at the UNFCCC events and meetings.** This is important because these events are a chance for civil society to showcase the reality of climate change impacts on Arab nations.
- **Climate change should not be considered a secondary issue.** In many Arab states, people don't understand the critical role of climate change institutions and ministries. These institutions should not be viewed as a waste of resources, and they should receive more support from the public so that they don't remain underfunded.
- **We need more young people in the climate and energy field** because it is the future of the Arab States. The region needs more scientists and engineers who can create breakthroughs in these fields in the near and distant future.
- **Encouraging the adoption of close cooperation efforts** between the political leaders in the region, not only on the ministerial level but also on the secretary-generals level at the ministries of energy and environment.
- **The nexus of energy-water-food securities cannot be solved in isolation.** Hence, the swaps of benefits/benefit sharing agreements between the countries of the region are highly required. (Acting more incoherence rather than in isolation mindsets).
- **Increasing synergies and reducing the trade-offs.** This could be done through continuous planning and stakeholders' engagement on a regional level and by increasing capacity-building efforts on national levels for better collective cooperation.
- **Affirming common interests between the Arab countries**, such as the electricity interlinkages, hydrogen markets, natural resources trade, as well as cross-cutting R&D potentials.
- **Electricity interconnections are huge potentials as the first step** for regional collaboration. However, water interconnections could be considered another major driver for future regional cooperation, due to the increasing water stresses in the region.
- **Intensifying the role of energy, climate, and environmental scientists**, as well as ecological economists in the COP negotiations. Confining this to only politicians and civil society actors will prevent the region from developing its technological capacities.
- **Creating proper communication events on the energy transition and climate actions** and involving qualified and experienced stakeholders from governments, civil society, academia, private sector, etc.



Annex 1

# Summary list of UNFCCC COPs from 1995 - 2021

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## Conference of the Parties 1

Berlin Mandate 28 Mar 1995 - 07 Apr 1995

- The first UNFCCC Conference of the Parties took place from 28 March to 7 April 1995 in Berlin, Germany.
- It voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries' abilities to meet commitments under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).
- COP1 agreed on "Activities Implemented Jointly", the first joint measures in international climate action.

## Conference of the Parties 2

Geneva, Switzerland 08 Jul 1996 - 19 Jul 1996

- COP2 took place in July 1996 in Geneva, Switzerland.
- Its ministerial declaration was noted (but not adopted) on 18 July 1996 and reflected a United States position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global Affairs for the United States Department of State, at that meeting.

## Conference of the Parties 3

Kyoto, Japan 1997

- In 1997, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted at COP3 in Kyoto, Japan.

## Conference of the Parties 4

Buenos Aires, Argentina 02 Nov 1998 - 13 Nov 1998

- COP4 took place in November 1998 in Buenos Aires.
- It had been expected that the remaining issues unresolved in Kyoto would be finalized at this meeting.
- However, the complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved insurmountable, and instead, the parties adopted a 2-year “Plan of Action” to advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to be completed by 2000.
- During COP4, Argentina and Kazakhstan expressed their commitment to take on the greenhouse gas emissions reduction obligation, the first two non-Annex countries to do so.

## Conference of the Parties 5

Bonn, Germany 25 Oct 1999 - 05 Nov 1999

- COP5 took place between 25 October and 5 November 1999, in Bonn, Germany.
- It was primarily a technical meeting and did not reach major conclusions.

## Conference of the Parties 6

The Hague, Netherlands 13 Nov 2000 - 24 Nov 2000

- COP6 took place on 13–25 November 2000, in The Hague, Netherlands.
- The discussions evolved rapidly into a high-level negotiation over the major political issues.
- These included the major controversy over the United States’ proposal to allow credit for carbon “sinks” in forests and agricultural lands that would satisfy a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
- In the final hours of COP6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP6, suspended COP6 without agreement, with the expectation that negotiations would later resume.
- It was later announced that the COP6 meetings (termed “COP6 bis”) would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of July.

- The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC, COP7, had been set for Marrakech, Morocco, in October–November 2001.

## **Conference of the Parties 7**

Marrakech, Morocco 29 Oct 2001 - 10 Nov 2001

- At the COP7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco from 29 October to 10 November 2001, negotiators wrapped up the work on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
- The completed package of decisions is known as the Marrakech Accords.
- The United States delegation maintained its observer role, declining to participate actively in the negotiations.
- Other parties continued to express hope that the United States would re-engage in the process at some point and worked to achieve ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by the requisite number of countries to bring it into force (55 countries needed to ratify it, including those accounting for 55% of developed-country emissions of carbon dioxide in 1990).
- The date of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (August–September 2002) was put forward as a target to bring the Kyoto Protocol into force.

## **Conference of the Parties 8**

New Delhi, India 23 Oct 2002 - 01 Nov 2002

- Taking place from 23 October to 1 November 2002, in New Delhi COP8 adopted the Delhi Ministerial Declaration that, amongst others, called for efforts by developed countries to transfer technology and minimize the impact of climate change on developing countries.
- It is also approved the New Delhi work programme on Article 6 of the Convention.
- The COP8 was marked by Russia's hesitation, stating that it needed more time to think it over.
- The Kyoto Protocol could enter into force once it was ratified by 55 countries, including countries responsible for 55 per cent of the developed world's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions.
- With the United States (36.1 per cent share of developed-world carbon dioxide) and Australia refusing ratification, Russia's agreement (17% of global emissions in 1990) was required to meet the ratification criteria and therefore Russia could delay the process.

## Conference of the Parties 9

Milan, Italy 01 Dec 2003 - 12 Dec 2003

- COP9 took place on 1–12 December 2003 in Milan. The parties agreed to use the Adaptation Fund established at COP7 in 2001 primarily in supporting developing countries better adapt to climate change.
- The fund would also be used for capacity-building through technology transfer. At COP9, the parties also agreed to review the first national reports submitted by 110 non-Annex I countries.

## Conference of the Parties 10

Buenos Aires, Argentina 06 Dec 2004 - 17 Dec 2004

- COP10 discussed the progress made since the first Conference of the Parties 10 years ago and its future challenges, with special emphasis on climate change mitigation and adaptation.
- To promote developing countries better adapt to climate change, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted.
- The parties also began discussing the post-Kyoto mechanism, on how to allocate emission reduction obligation following 2012, when the first commitment period ends.

## Conference of the Parties 11

Montreal, Canada 28 Nov 2005 - 09 Dec 2005

- COP11/CMP 1 took place between 28 November and 9 December 2005 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
- It was the first Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1) since their initial meeting in Kyoto in 1997.
- It was one of the largest intergovernmental conferences on climate change ever.
- The event marked the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. Hosting more than 10,000 delegates, it was one of Canada's largest international events ever and the largest gathering in Montreal since Expo 67.
- The Montreal Action Plan was an agreement to "extend the life of the Kyoto Protocol beyond its 2012 expiration date and negotiate deeper cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions".
- Canada's environment minister, at the time, Stéphane Dion, said the agreement provides a "map for the future".

## Conference of the Parties 12

Nairobi, Kenya 06 Nov 2006 - 17 Nov 2006

- COP12/CMP 2 took place on 6–17 November 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. At the meeting, BBC reporter Richard Black coined the phrase “climate tourists” to describe some delegates who attended “to see Africa, take snaps of the wildlife, the poor, dying African children and women”.
- Black also noted that due to delegates concerns over economic costs and possible losses of competitiveness, the majority of the discussions avoided any mention of reducing emissions.
- Black concluded that was disconnect between the political process and the scientific imperative.
- Despite such criticism, certain strides were made at COP12, including in the areas of support for developing countries and clean development mechanisms.
- The parties adopted a five-year plan of work to support climate change adaptation by developing countries and agreed on the procedures and modalities for the Adaptation Fund.
- They also agreed to improve the projects for a clean development mechanism.

## Conference of the Parties 13

Bali, Indonesia 03 Dec 2007 - 17 Dec 2007

- COP13/CMP 3 took place on 3–17 December 2007, at Nusa Dua, in Bali, Indonesia.
- Agreement on a timeline and structured negotiation on the post-2012 framework (the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol) was achieved with the adoption of the Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP.13).
- The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) was established as a new subsidiary body to conduct the negotiations aimed at urgently enhancing the implementation of the Convention up to and beyond 2012.
- Decision 9/CP.13 is an Amended to the New Delhi work programme.
- These negotiations took place during 2008 (leading to COP14/CMP 4 in Poznan, Poland) and 2009 (leading to COP15/CMP 5 in Copenhagen).

## Conference of the Parties 14

Poznań, Poland 01 Dec 2008 - 12 Dec 2008

- COP14/CMP 4 took place on 1–12 December 2008 in Poznań, Poland.
- Delegates agreed on principles for the financing of a fund to help the poorest nations cope with the effects of climate change and they approved a mechanism to incorporate forest protection into the efforts of the international community to combat climate change.
- Negotiations on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol were the primary focus of the conference.

## Conference of the Parties 15

Copenhagen, Denmark 07 Dec 2009 - 18 Dec 2009

- COP15 took place in Copenhagen, Denmark, on 7–18 December 2009.
- The overall goal for the COP15/CMP 5 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Denmark was to establish an ambitious global climate agreement for the period from 2012 when the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol expires.
- However, on 14 November 2009, the New York Times announced that “President Obama and other world leaders have decided to put off the difficult task of reaching a climate change agreement... agreeing instead to make it the mission of the Copenhagen conference to reach a less specific “politically binding” agreement that would punt the most difficult issues into the future”.

## Conference of the Parties 16

Cancún, Mexico 28 Nov 2010 - 10 Dec 2010

- COP16 was held in Cancún, Mexico, from 28 November to 10 December 2010.
- The outcome of the summit was an agreement adopted by the states’ parties that called for the US\$100 billion per annum “Green Climate Fund” and a “Climate Technology Centre” and network.
- However, the funding of the Green Climate Fund was not agreed upon.
- Nor was a commitment to a second period of the Kyoto Protocol agreed upon, but it was concluded that the base year should be 1990, and the global warming potentials shall be those provided by the IPCC.
- All parties “Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet, and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties,”

## Conference of the Parties 17

Durban, South Africa 28 Nov 2011 - 09 Dec 2011

- The 2011 COP17 was held in Durban, South Africa, from 28 November to 9 December 2011.
- The conference agreed to start a negotiation on a legally binding deal comprising all countries, to be adopted in 2015, governing the period post 2020.
- There was also progress regarding the creation of a Green Climate Fund (GCF) for which a management framework was adopted.
- The fund is to distribute US\$100 billion per year to help poor countries adapt to climate impacts.
- While the president of the conference, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, declared it a success, scientists and environmental groups warned that the deal was not sufficient to avoid global warming beyond 2 °C as more urgent action is needed.

## **Conference of the Parties 18**

Doha, Qatar 26 Nov 2012 - 07 Dec 2012

- Qatar hosted COP18 which took place in Doha, Qatar, from 26 November to 7 December 2012.
- The Conference produced a package of documents collectively titled The Doha Climate Gateway.
- The conference made little progress towards the funding of the Green Climate Fund.

## **Conference of the Parties 19**

Warsaw, Poland 11 Nov 2013 - 23 Nov 2013

- COP19 was the 19th yearly session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 9th session of the Meeting of the Parties (CMP) to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (the protocol having been developed under the UNFCCC's charter).
- The conference was held in Warsaw, Poland from 11 to 23 November 2013.

## **Conference of the Parties 20**

Lima, Peru 01 Dec 2014 - 12 Dec 2014

- On 1–12 December 2014, Lima, Peru hosted the 20th yearly session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 10th session of the Meeting of the Parties (CMP) to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (the protocol having been developed under the UNFCCC's charter).
- The pre-COP conference was held in Venezuela.

## **Conference of the Parties 21**

Paris, France 30 Nov 2015 - 12 Dec 2015

- The COP21 was held in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015. Negotiations resulted in the adoption of the Paris Agreement on 12 December, governing climate change reduction measures from 2020.
- The adoption of this agreement ended the work of the Durban platform, established during COP17.
- The agreement will enter into force (and thus become fully effective) on 4 November 2016.
- On 4 October 2016 the threshold for adoption was reached with over 55 countries representing at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions ratifying the Agreement.

## Conference of the Parties 22

Marrakech, Morocco 07 Nov 2016 - 18 Nov 2016

- COP22 was held in Marrakech, in the North-African country of Morocco, on 7–18 November 2016.
- A focal issue of COP22 is that of water scarcity, water cleanliness, and water-related sustainability, a major problem in the developing world, including many African states.
- Prior to the event a special initiative on water was presided by Charafat Afaïlal, Morocco's Minister in Charge of Water and Aziz Mekouar, COP22 Ambassador for Multilateral Negotiations. Another focal issue was the need to reduce greenhouse emissions and utilize low-carbon energy sources.
- Mr. Peter Thompson, President of the UN General Assembly, called for the transformation of the global economy in all sectors to achieve a low emissions global economy.

## Conference of the Parties 23

Bonn, Germany 06 Nov 2017 - 17 Nov 2017

- COP23 was held on 6–17 November 2017.
- On Friday, 18 November 2016, the end of COP22, the Chairperson of COP23 from Fiji announced that it will be held in Bonn, Germany. (COP23/CMP 13).
- Fijian Prime Minister and incoming President of COP 23, Frank Bainimarama, on 13 April launched the logo for this year's United Nations Climate Change Conference, to be held at UN Campus, Bonn in November.

## Conference of the Parties 24

Katowice, Poland 03 Dec 2018 - 14 Dec 2018

- COP24 was held on 3–14 December 2018 in Katowice, Poland. The Polish government's vision for presidency states that the organization of COP24 will provide an opportunity for convincing other countries that Poland does not hamper the process of tackling dangerous climate change and that Poland is one of the leaders of this process.

## Conference of the Parties 25

Madrid, Spain 02 Dec 2019 - 13 Dec 2019

- The UN Climate Change Conference COP25 (2 – 13 December 2019) will take place under the Presidency of the Government of Chile and will be held with logistical support from the Government of Spain.
- SBSTA 51/ SBI 51 will take place 2-9 December 2019. The pre-sessional period is from 25 November - 1 December 2019. The President-Designate for the conference is Ms. Carolina Schmidt Saldivar, Minister of Environment of Chile.



## Annex 2

The status of Arab countries submission of NDC reports to the UNFCCC (Website visited on December 24, 2021, from the following link: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/NDC-submissions>)

Country name (alphabetically)	Date of submission of the first NDC	Date of submission of the NDC update
Algeria	20/10/2016	-
Bahrain	30/12/2016	18/10/2021
Comoros	23/11/2016	05/11/2021
Djibouti	11/11/2016	-
Egypt	29/06/2017	-
Iraq	15/10/2021	-
Jordan	04/11/2016	12/10/2021
Kuwait	23/04/2018	12/10/2021
Lebanon	05/02/2020	16/03/2021
Libya	-	-
Mauritania	27/02/2017	12/10/2021
Morocco	19/09/2016	22/06/2021
Oman	22/05/2019	29/07/2021
Palestine	21/08/2017	10/10/2021
Qatar	23/06/2017	24/08/2021
Saudi Arabia	03/11/2016	23/10/2021
Somalia	22/04/2016	31/07/2021
Sudan	02/08/2017	31/05/2021
Syria	30/11/2018	-
Tunisia	10/02/2017	10/10/2021
UAE	21/09/2016	22/04/2021
Yemen	22/04/2016	31/07/2021

## Annex 3

## List of Interviewed Experts

Name	Title and Organisation	Country
Abdallah Emad Afify	Children and Youth constituency to UNFCCC	Egypt
Dr Maha Al Zu'bi	Researcher - Agriculture Water Solutions at International Water Management Institute (IWMI)	Jordan
Dr Rania Masri	University Lecturer at Lebanese American University and Northwestern University	Lebanon
Eman Adel	Renewable Energy Engineering Specialist at RCREEE	Egypt
Esam Al Murawwi	Power Projects Division Manager at TRANSCO	UAE
Fadi Al-Shihabi	Associate Partner at EY Group	Iraq/ Saudi Arabia
Hussein Abaza	Director of the Association for Environmental and Community Development (ACED), the Centre for Sustainable Development Solutions (CSDS), he also is a Counselor for the State Minister of the Environment.	Egypt
Hussein Muhsen	Low Emissions Development Specialist at GIZ	Jordan
Mohammad Asfour	Regional Head, MENA & Africa Networks at World Green Building Council	Jordan
Mostafa Hasaneen	Sustainable Energy Expert at RCREEE	Egypt
Radia Sedaoui	Chief Energy Department at UN ESCWA	Algeria/Lebanon
Reem Al Haddadin	Researcher at West Asia North Africa (WANA) Institute	Jordan
Tareq Hassan	UNEP Regional focal point and Country Director at Qatar Charity	Yemen/ Qatar

## List of Abbreviations

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AILAC	The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean
ALBA	The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, China India
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CCS	Carbon Capture and Sequestration
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CMA	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
CMP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTCN	Climate Technology Centre & Network
EIG	Environmental Integrity Group.
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Green Environment Facility
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KP	Kyoto Protocol
L&D	Loss and Damage
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LMDCs	Like Minded-Group of Developing Countries
NDCs	Nationally Determined Contributions
OECD	Economic Co-operation and Development
PA	Paris Agreement
PESTEL	Political, Environmental, Social, Technological, Economical, Legal
R&D	Research and Development
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TNAs	Technology Needs Assessments
UNFCCC	The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WIM	Warsaw International Mechanism

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